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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------
----------------------
SHIRLEY W. ADAMS 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant Case No. 15, 673 
vs. 
CHARLES W. ADAMS 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff pursuant to the 
continuing jurisdiction of the District Court in a domestic matter, 
based on an Order to Show Cause issued by the Trial Court as to 
why the Defendant should not be ordered to pay alimony which had 
accrued and remained unpaid. Defendant objected to the Order to 
Show Cause, on the bases that Plaintiff was estopped from claiming 
any past due alimony, and requested the Trial Court to terminate 
Defendant's alimony obligation under the Decree. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court in its decision held that the Defendant 
erroneously but in good faith believed his alimony obligation 
to the Plaintiff had terminated at the time he obtained custody 
of his children in March 1972. Thereafter, for a period of more 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 than five (5) years the Defendant did not pay alimony to the Plaintiff and no claim therefore was asserted by her against 
him until October 1977, at which time arrearages had accrued unde: 
the terms of the Decree in the amount of Seven Thousand Five H uni1 
and Ninety Dollars ($7,590.00). 
The Court found that the Plaintiff knew or should have knowt 
within a few months after the children were awarded to the Defent· 
ant in March 1972, not exceeding six months, that the Defendant 
did not recognize any obligation to pay alimony, and at that tioc 
Plaintiff had the duty to inform the Defendant that she claimed 
alimony, if in fact she did so claim, and in equity and good 
conscious Plaintiff could not remain silent concerning her claio, 
thereby lulling Defendant into inaction with respect to seekiq 
a modification of the Decree. Futhermore, the Court held that 
Plaintiff is estopped to claim alimony against the Defendant 
except as to any artearages which had accumulated to the timet~' 
children were awarded to the Defendant in March 1972, and for 
I 
six months thereafter. The Court also found that for good cause 
shown the Decree was to be modified reducing alimony to the sn 
One Dollar ($1.00) per year. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays that the judgment of the Trial Court 
be affirmed and that a finding be made that the Trial Court 
did not abuse its discretion based upon the facts of this 
there by affirming the Lower Court's decision particular case, 
and awarding Defendant his costs. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on May 13, 1954, and divorced 
on March 27, 1970. The Decree was modified on June 16, 1970, 
January 17, 1972, and March 31, 1972. The last modification 
awarded custody of the minor children of the parties to the 
Defendant and terminated the child support obligations. 
From March 1972, until the time the action was initiated 
by the Plaintiff in October 1977, the Defendant paid no alimony. 
However, he did pay the sum of Seven Hundred and Seven Dollars 
and fifty cents ($707.50) which was a payment on a Judgment past 
due. Never during the five and a half year period from 1972 to 
1977 did the Plaintiff make any claim against the Defendant for 
alimony she claimed was due and owing. The Defendant continued 
to reside in Utah County and made no attempt at all to avoid the 
Plaintiff and as a matter of fact had contacts with her during 
that period of time. (T., 12,13,14,15) The Defendant further 
testified that prior to March 1972 his former wife was constantly 
pursuing him if he became delinquent on the support and obligation 
paymen~s. However, after March 1972, no effort at all was made 
to contact the Defend•nt with regard to the claimed alimony. 
(T., 11) The Defendant remarried in June 1973; purchased a home for 
him and his new family and has continued to reside in Utah County. 
( T. I 11) 
The Trial Court found that a substantial change of circum-
stances had occurred since the time of the last modification of the 
Decree to justify the reduction of alimony to the sum of One Dollar 
($1.00) per year. In 1972 at the time the Divorce Decree was last 
-3-
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modified, the Plaintiff was unemployed, 
Si "'" '" ..... ""' 1 
State Training School in' has been employed full time at the Utah 
I 
American Fork, Utah. With that full time employment she has be" 
able to obtain income at the rate of Six Hundred and Thirty-Nine 
Dollars ($639.00) per month gross. (T., 18,19) Plaintiff does 
not have the responsibility of supporting anyone other than 
herself inasmuch as the children are living with their father 
and have been since March 1972. The Six Hundred and Thirty-Nine 
Dollars ($639.00) is allocated to her own private needs rather 
than for the support of any other individual. (T.,l9) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL MAY BE RAISED AS 
A DEFENSE TO PAYMENT OF ALIMONY WHEN THE 
HUSBAND RELIED UPON THE WIFE'S SILENCE OR 
FAILURE TO PURSUE HER CLAIM WHERE SHE HAD 
A LEGAL OR MORAL DUTY TO SPEAK. 
Appellant cites several cases in support of her contention. 
and although the principles remain the same, application of thn! 
principles may differ since each of the cited cases is distir 
guishable on the facts. 
los U h 574 144 P.2d 5 28 (194li In Openshaw v. Openshaw, ta , 
Defendant-Husband had raised no defense of estoppel and in fact 
the Trial Court invoked the doctrine of laches on behalf of th< 
Defendant-Husband, not the doctrine of estoppel as was effect!' 
asserted in the instant case. the equ ities of th' In Openshaw, 
case clearly favored the Plaintiff-Wife since the Defendant hi· 
openly acknowledged that he owed alimony, had 0 f t e n t r i e d t 0 ;· 
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the Court to reduce the amount, had been found guilty of contempt 
for not making the payments, and had tried to mislead the Court by 
fraud and deceit. In the case at hand, the equities are much more 
evenly balanced and the decision of the Trial Court should be 
looked on favorably, 
Appellant urges that French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 2d 360, 401 
P.2d 315 (1965), is A FORTIORI to the instant case. French involved 
a default in child support payments, and because of the distinct 
nature of the child support obligation, the respondent feels 
French is not A FORTIORI to the instant case, especially since in 
French this Court looked very heavily at the parental responsibility, 
and in the three to two decision, the dissent would have released 
the father from the child support decree even though he had the 
moral parental obligation. However, French did rely on a principle 
which is concededly applicable to the instant case: "Mere silence 
over a period of time will not raise an estoppel where there is 
no legal or moral duty to speak". (Id. p315). In the instant 
case, the Trial Court did find a legal or moral duty to speak on 
the part of the Appellant, and considering the particular facts of 
the situation, the Trial Court appropriately used its discretion 
to so find. 
Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (1974), again involves child 
support payments which differ distinctively from alimony partially 
because the right to receive child support payments is held by the 
children and cannot be estopped by actions of the parents, 
especially in~ where the claimed estoppel was based to a 
considerable extent upon conduct and statements of a third party. 
~ is a case that deals with general estoppel principles 
-5-
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which are, if looked at in l light of the peculiar facts, applicabi;' 
to the instant case, 
This Court held in Utah State Building Commission v G 
_ • re.!.! 
American Indemnity Company, 105 Utah 11, 140 P. 2d 763 0943), n, 
mere inaction or silence may, under peculiar circumstances, amon 
to both misrepresentation and concealment which may amount to an 
estoppel. The two caveats of that decision are that the Plaintil 
must have a right to speak but did not exercise that right, and 
that there must be a duty on the part of the Plaintiff to speak, 
Clearly the Plaintiff in the instant case had a right to speak 
and did not do so for over five years, and clearly it is the 
Plaintiff's duty to assert her cl~im for alimony, not the duty~ 
anyone else to claim for her, 
This Court, in Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P.2d 5!' 
(1956), held that: 
"Where the father's failure to make such payments 
was induced by her representations or actions" 
(such as silence, 28 AmJur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver 
§53) "and where as a result of such representations 
or actions the father has been lulled into failing 
to make such payments and into changing his position 
which he would not have done but for such representa-
tions, and that as a result for such failure to pay 
and change in his conditions it will cause him great 
hardship and injustice if she is allowed to enforce 
the payment of such back installments, she may be 
thereby estopped from enforcing the payment of such 
back installments," (p.598) 
This Court may use the principle setforth in Larsen to avoid 
the great hardship that would result by now forcing the Respondi 
to make such payments after having been lulled into not making 
payments through the Appellant's failure to assert her right 
-6-
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thereto. 
By way of analogy, if a divorced wife is not claiming 
reimbursement for expenses and has, in fact, supported herself and 
has received support from a second husband, then estoppel will be 
allowed. Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P. 2d 895 (Utah, 1976). 
Although the Wasescha decision depended heavily on the wife's 
remarriage, the same reasons for looking at remarriage apply here. 
The Appellant has supported herself and has not found it necessary 
to rely on the Respondent for over five and a half years, so that 
the Trial Court was within its discretion to find that estoppel 
should apply especially when the claim would operate to create 
injustice and undue burden. 
This principle has been affirmed by this Court, by Mr. Justice 
Crockett concurring in Wallis v. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237, 342 P.2d 
103 (1959), and subscribed to by this Court in Peterson v. Peterson, 
530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974): 
"The purpose of the provision for alimony and support 
money is to provide for the current needs, and not to 
allow the beneficiary to sit by and permit a burden-
some debt to accumulate and then use it to harass the 
defendant so that he cannot hold a job or live a 
respectable existence." 
The Trial Court has not abused its discretion in its Findings 
of Fact and it has conscientiously applied principles of law to 
the particular facts of this case in an equitable fashion. None 
of this Court's previous decisions will be adversely affected by 
upholding this decision. Estoppel has been found based on silence 
with a duty to speak and on the balancing of equities of this case. 
-7-
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Each statute of limitations already imposes a duty to 
within a given time period or risk losing that claim. It ia 
already the duty of the claim-holder to pursue and enforce that 
claim. Upholding this case will not extend any statute of limit!· 
tiona or create any new duties, but will recognize the equities' 
of this particular fact situation and will reaffirm the duty of 
the Trial Court to use educated discretion. 
POINT II 
THE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL SHOULD 
BE ALLOWED TO APPLY SO AS TO BEST FIT THE 
NEEDS OF A PARTICULAR SITUATION. 
Respondent agrees with the equitable principle urged on the 
Court by the Appellant, but feels that application of this 
principle will not alter the result in this case and that perha,.' 
application of this principle is not even appropriate. The 
principle is thus articulated by the United States Supreme Court 
"Where one of two innocent persons must suffer a 
loss, and one of them has contributed to produce 
it, the law throws the burden upon him and not 
upon the other party". Pompton v. Cooper Union, 
101 u.s. 196 (1879) 
This Court said in Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, S1! 
P.2d 1121 (1974): 
"Ordinarily, where one of two innocent parties must 
suffer a loss it should be borne by the one whose 
conduct created the circumstances which permitted 
the loss to occur. But here there are other and 
more important considerations which provide the " 
controlling solution to the problem confronted here • 
Appellant construes the facts to find that the Respondent 
-8-
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is the party through whose agency the loss occurred. In this 
situtation it appears equally possible to construe the facts so that 
the Appellant is the responsible party, or perhaps that neither 
party carries any more responsibility than the other. 
Appellant contends that the Respondent "must have or should 
have known that the burden to further modify the Decree regarding 
alimony payments was also his burden," but it is just as easy to 
suppose that the Respondent thought he was modifing the entire Decree 
when he modified the child support payments. Since the nature of 
alimony is often a little unclear even to experienced members of the 
bar, then why should we assume that the Respondent had any better 
understanding of the relation of alimony to child support. In fact, 
he testified that he thought the Decree had ended any obligation 
he had to her, (T,, 8,9) 
Appellant further asserts that any loss could not have occurred 
through her agency because she was not even present for the Decree 
modification, and that she made no representations concerning dis-
continuance of alimony payments. One might wonder why Appellant was 
not present at that time and why she waits for more than five years 
to bring her claim for back payments. Previous to the Decree, the 
Appellant hounded the Respondent continually for support payments, 
and then for five years was silent. (T.,8,9) As Appellant points 
out, reasons and motivations for the actions of the two parties is 
largely a matter of conjecture. Respondent feels that identifying 
the party through whose agency the loss occurred is not nearly 
as simple as Appellant seems to believe, and that in this case the 
Court should affirm the decision of the Trial Court as it decided 
with discretion looking at all the facts. 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services nd Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The nature of the doctrine of estoppel extends beyond 
principles, This Court in Petterson v. Ogden City, 11 Utah 125, 
176 P.2d 599 (1947), used another principle which may contrast 
with the one urged upon the Court here. This Court stated: 
"Both laches and estoppel are bars which in certain 
circumstances may be raised to defeat a right or 
claim a party otherwise would have. The Courts 
refuse to give their aid to the party who has slept 
on his rights or who because of his actions or 
inaction when it is required was not fairly entitled 
to relief. (p. 604) 
And as was stated in American Jurisprudence, 28 Am Jur 2d, Esto!: 
and Waiver §28, and applied in an Idaho case, Dalton Highway Dirt 
of Kootenai County v. Sowder, 401 P.2d 813 (Idaho, 1965): 
" Since, however, the principle that underlies equitable 
estoppel in its proper sense runs throughout all the 
transactions and contracts of civilized life, such 
estoppels cannot be subjected to fined and settled 
rules of universal application, like legal estoppels, 
or hampered by the narrow confines of a technical rule." 
Respondent urges that the Trial Court was within its discrl' 
to apply the principles of equitable estoppel as it saw the pu: 
ular eqities and should therefore be supported in its decision. 
as 
POINT III 
A PARTY MAY BE ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING PAST 
DUE INSTALLMENTS OF ALIMONY AWARDS. 
Appellant totally misconstrues the action of the Trial ~~ 
retroactively modifying the alimony award when in fact it 
estopped the Appellant from claiming past due alimony payment! 
and only prospectively modified the award. 
While the general rule appears to be that alimony wards'' 
not be retroactively modified, even if no estoppel was found, 
· 1 f h · h would allow the Court 1 could have been part1cu ar acts w 1c 
-10-
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apply an exception to the general rule. It is commonly accepted 
that subsequent remarriage of the wife will terminate the husband's 
support obligation to her. Kent v. Kent, 28 Utah 2d 34, 497 P.2d 
652 (1972); Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 284 (1954). 
While the wife's remarriage did not occur in this case, it points 
out that there must be exceptions to any general rule when there 
are equities involved. The basis for the exception of terminating 
the husband's obligation when the wife remarries is that she has 
acquired support from another source and it would not be equitable 
for her to receive support from two sources. (Austad, Id. P• 288). 
Many of the former notions concerning alimony are being dissipated 
as we come to realize that women can be self-sufficient and that 
there is little basis for giving women an inalienable right to 
support from their former husbands. In 1954, District Judge Hoyt, 
in his concurring opinion in Austad v. Austad, Id. p. 292, said: 
"Certainly it is unjust to compel a husband to continue 
to support a divorced wife who has remarried and has 
adequate support from another husband. But other situa-
tions also come before the courts where it is inequitable 
to compel a divorced husband to pay accrued installments 
of alimony or of support money for support of children in 
accordance with the terms of a divorce decree. If a 
divorced wife, who has been awarded custody of children 
and an allowance from the husband for their support, 
thereafter deserts the children and they are taken 
over and cared for by the husband, it is clearly desir-
able and equitable to relieve him of payment of support 
money from the date of such desertion. Why should it 
be held that the court has no power to do equity in such 
a situation? If it so happens, as it very often does, 
that the divorced husband fails to apply promptly to the 
Court for modification of the decree, shall we say that 
he must therefore pay the installments ordered to be 
paid up to the date of the order of modification, or as 
some courts have said, up to the date of his applicat-
tion for modification? Should the court put such a 
penalty of lack of vigilance? I believe not." 
-11-
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Judge Hoyt also pointed out that the statute cited b J 
Appellant, Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 0953), places no :e:::ic· 
tions on retroactive modification, and in fact the statute 
changes as are reasonable and necessary. 
An alimony award that is not allowed to be modififed 
according to the equities of the particular situation would as&ut 
the character of a punishment. There would be no purpose in en· 
forcing past due installments of alimony when the wife has alrea: 
supported herself adequately. 
Estoppel has been accepted as an equitable principle thatt! 
be applied to cases such as this. Larsen v. Larsen, supra. The 
Trial Court appropriately used its discretion in applying estopp 
to this case and its decision should not be disturbed. 
POINT IV 
PROOF OF CHANGED CONDITIONS ARISING SINCE 
THE LAST MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE CAN 
BE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A REDUCTION OF 
ALIMONY. 
Appellant contends that no adequate change of circumstanc'' 
is present in order to justify a reduction of alimony. The lr 
Court found that there was a significant change of circumstanc<! 
since the e.ntry of the Decree (Findings of Fact 4!8), and based 
that finding it reduced the alimony to $1.00 per year which 611 
allows the Court to maintain jurisdiction over the matter. 
The Court's comment as cited by the Appellant (T., 25) con· 
cerning the Appellant no longer having custody of or obligatiO' 
for the children, does not necessarily mean that that was the· 
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the evidence, it could easily have decided to reduce the alimony 
based on the Appellant's increased earning capacity and self-
suffience, and on the remarriage of the Respondent and his 
establishing a home for the four children. 
The Trial Court's finding must be looked at in a light most 
favorable to the Respondent, and its exercise of discretion accord-
ing to the equities of this case must be given deference and the 
modification allowed to stand. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S 
FEES EITHER ON THE APPEAL OR AT TRIAL BELOW. 
At common law, attorney's fees were not recoverable by either 
party, and this Court has repeatedly held that attorney's fees are 
not awardable where there is no statutory sanction therefor or 
where there is no agreement between the parties. Hawkins v. Perry, 
123 Utah 16, 253 P.2d 372 (1953); C.G. Horman Co. v. Lloyd, 28 Utah 
2d 112, 499 P.2d 124 (1972); Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah, 
1977). 
Attorney's fees on appeal are said to be discretionary with 
this Court and then only when specifically authorized by statute or 
rule of court. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 556 P.2d 
1273 (Utah 1976); Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment Co., 
Utah 2d 121, 279 P.2d 209 (1955). 
Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977) announces what may 
be construed as a rule of court, but would only apply where the 
order of the Trial Court is patently erroneous. Repsondent urges 
-13-
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, 
I 
that that is not the case here, that the facts in this case areil 
no way comparable to those in ~. and that the Trial Court in 
this case was well within its discretion to apply the rule of 
equity to the facts as it saw them, and that in this case the 
Appellant is not entitled to attorney's fees, either on this~~ 
or at the hearing below. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the Trial Court dia 
not abuse its discretion in arriving at its findings, Total 
examination of all of the evidences in light of the circumstanc11 
surrounding each of the parties with the consideration of what~ 
fair and equitable to the parties herein can very well allow 
this Court to find that the Trial Court acted within its discret 
and acted properly in arriving at its decision and therefore th< 
same should be affirmed. 
DATED and SIGNED this ~day of May, 1978. 
-14-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
il#_ ~f'L Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
STOTT, YOUNG AND WILSON 
350 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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